We propose a novel data hiding system where data is embedded in local non-overlapping regions in an image. To survive cropping, the encoder embeds the same data in multiple regions of fixed dimensions, while the decoder's challenge is to independently retrieve these regions. Salient feature points are computed on an image and the local regions are centered around them. To obtain non-overlapping regions, the points are pruned based on their corner strength and the size of the region. The decoder can retrieve the data only if it can precisely identify one or more of the same key-points. We present suitable key-point pruning methods such that even after considering a reduced number of key-points, the receiver is successful in identifying the same key-point locations as the encoder. We perform experimental comparison of various corner detectors and also study the performance of segmentation methods to obtain robust key-points.
INTRODUCTION
Data embedding in digital multimedia finds many applications ranging from digital watermarking, secret communications, copyright protection, content authentication and others. Recent watermarking methods focus on embedding the watermark in local regions rather than the entire image to survive attacks like cropping. Most of these methods find salient points in an image to identify these regions. If the image undergoes a geometric transformation, the transform parameters are computed using various techniques and the image is usually realigned back to its original grid to extract the watermark. The data hiding problem is more challenging because the receiver has to blindly decode the data without having access to the original watermark. Most of the research is focused on hiding data in the entire image, while very few works address the challenge of robust data hiding in local image regions. Although, the amount of data that is hidden is less, local region based data hiding can survive attacks such We propose a robust data hiding system by hiding the same data in different local regions in an image. To make the system robust to geometric transforms, synchronization peaks are inserted in the mid-frequency band of the Fourier magnitude domain whose positions are shared between encoder and decoder [1] . Although peak based methods are resistant against geometric transforms, they lack security since the peaks can be easily detected and smoothed out by an adversary. However, our aim here is to achieve robust rather than secure data hiding.
In our hiding scheme, the hiding occurs in non-overlapping square regions of fixed dimensions (Fig. 1) . We use various corner point detectors to obtain the key-points (KP) and then prune them based on relative corner strengths and spatial constraints (non-overlapping) to obtain the hiding regions. We compare the performance of various corner point detectors and also see the effectiveness of the salient region based methods. We now explain the three main modules in our hiding system -encoder, channel and decoder.
Encoder: (Fig. 2(a) ) Before encoding, peaks are inserted in the Fourier magnitude domain of the image. In the encoder, salient points are computed and data embedding is repeated in B × B square regions centered around a pruned set of keypoints (the pruning method is described in Sec. 3). Embed- Fig. 2 . The end-to-end data hiding framework (a) encoder: the same encoded sequence is embedded in every local region around a key-point, (b) channel: the stego image can be subjected to geometrical transformations, followed by image processing attacks, (c) decoder: it aligns the received image with the original image grid and decodes data from the local regions around detected key-points. The boxes outlined in bold represent the main challenges/tasks at the encoder and the decoder.
ding [2] is done using quantization index modulation (QIM) in non-overlapping 8×8 blocks in each B × B region. For embedding, we choose a certain low and mid-frequency band in the AC DCT domain. Since QIM is used, the decoder needs to access the same set of coefficients as the encoder -a shift of one pixel will cause desynchronization between the set of hiding coefficients considered at the encoder and the decoder. The data-bits are encoded using a turbo encoder. Channel: (Fig. 2(b) ) The stego image can be geometrically transformed using a 2×2 matrix A and then can be subjected to global image attacks and cropping. Decoder: (Fig. 2(c) ) The noisy stego image is first aligned with the original image grid by estimating the positions of DFT-domain peaks. Here, we do not describe how we estimate the peak positions. Then, the decoder obtains key-points from the aligned image (using the same pruning method as at the encoder). A question arises as to how the decoder knows if it has correctly identified a key-point. Turbo decoding is run on the extracted symbols corresponding to the block-based DCT coefficients obtained from the local region around that key-point. When the turbo decoding converges with a high average log-likelihood ratio (soft confidence values), then it is assumed that proper decoding has occurred. Our decoding method is robust to attacks such as JPEG, noise addition and the data can be decoded even after the received image has been re-aligned to its original grid after geometric attacks.
Paper Organization: The main contribution of this paper is the key-point pruning methods for different key-point detectors. Various salient point and salient region detectors are discussed in Sec. 2. Key-point pruning methods are discussed in Sec. 3. The detection results for the pruned key-points after various noise attacks are presented in Sec. 4.
CORNER POINT DETECTORS
When the geometrical transformations are compensated for (transformation by A in Fig. 2(b) followed by A −1 as in Fig. 2(c) ), the interpolation involved introduces noise among the pixel values. The factors affecting the accuracy of the KP detector are the interpolation noise and global noise introduced by the channel (Fig. 2(b) ).
Key-point detection methods: -This algorithm is mainly used for blob detection where the number of detected key-points equals a pre-assigned number of blobs. For HL and LoG, the scale factor associated with a KP is regarded as its corner strength.
Segmentation Methods: Maximally Stable Extremal Regions (MSER): An image is thresholded in to a set of binary images, with the thresholds in ascending order. The regions obtained are such that the boundary pixels (one pixel thick) have a higher or lower intensity than the pixels inside the region. The extremal regions are affine invariant for both geometrical and photometrical transformations [8] and their centroids are chosen as key-points. Fig. 3 . Fig.(a) : The KP pruning steps are shown. For two prospective KP ((M 3 , M 4 ) or (M 5 , M 6 )) which are less than B apart from each other, we retain the one with the higher strength. When the distance between two points (e.g. (M 1 , M 2 ) ) is greater than or equal to B, both can be retained. Fig.(b) and (c): The figures show the fraction of KP that are correctly detected using SIFT key-points at the decoder side before and after pruning, respectively. As an attack, we add various levels of Gaussian noise before decoding.
METHOD FOR PRUNING KEY-POINTS
The key-points have to be distributed well in the image to obtain non-overlapping regions. In [9] , Bas et al. describe a method to distribute the key-points using circular neighborhoods whose center is the considered key-point. We present a pruning scheme to prune a large set of key-points and obtain a smaller set of distributed points.
We first explain some notations that are used to explain the KP-based pruning method:
• B -the size of a local region used for hiding is B ×B.
• X enc , K enc -X enc is the set of K enc key-points obtained from the image at the encoder side where hiding occurs in B × B local regions around the key-points.
• X dec , K dec -X dec is the set of K dec key-points obtained after geometrically aligning the noisy received image with the original image.
• fr match -it denotes the fraction of the K dec key-points that correspond exactly to any of the K enc key-points used at the encoder, i.e. fr match = |X dec ∩ X enc |/K dec .
In our hiding scheme, we embed the same data in nonoverlapping B × B blocks centered on various key-points found on the image. The robustness of a key-point selection scheme requires that if this image undergoes changes due to peak insertion, data embedding, and channel attacks, it should still be possible to exactly recover some of the original key-points from the received image. A standard KP detection scheme yields a large number of points. One way to decode the data is through brute force by centering a square block on every obtained key-point and decode data wherever the turbo decoder converges. We present a pruning scheme to return a small number of salient points and in general, we observe that there are common KP between the encoder and decoder.
The steps in the key-point computation are outlined below. (1) Border effects -The key-points are computed in the Fig. 3(a) . This ensures that the (B×B) block around the keypoints do not extend outside the image. (2) Actual key-point computation -It is done using a variety of methods, as discussed in Sec. 2. The corner strength I(·) is computed for all key-points. We retain only those key-points whose corner strength exceeds a certain pre-defined threshold δ th , which is made low such that key-points are obtained in almost all regions of an image. Let there be K 1 such keypoints, given by Starting from the first point, the chessboard distance is computed with all other points. Those points whose distance is lesser than B is removed. This process is repeated for all points till there are no more close enough key-points. For example, one may end up with key-points M 3 = (y 3 , x 3 ) and M 4 = (y 4 , x 4 ), where max(|x 3 − x 4 |, |y 3 − y 4 |) < B, as in Fig. 3(a) . We cannot use both these points to obtain the hiding regions since we want the B × B blocks to be disjoint. The corner strength is used to decide between 2 (or more) points in such cases; e.g. we retain the key-point M 3 if I(M 3 ) > I(M 4 ) and vice versa. After removing all nearby points, let the final number of remaining points be K 2 , where K 2 ≤ K 1 . As an example of the amount of pruning achieved for SIFT key-points, the average value of K 1 using pruning steps (1)-(2) (for 512×512 images) varies from 900 to 5000 as δ th is decreased from 5 to 0; after pruning using steps (1)-(3), the corresponding K 2 varies from 12 to 21. The fraction of matching KP before and after pruning is shown in Fig. 3(b) , Fig. 3(c) respectively. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To reiterate, one source of error for the KP detector module (between encoder and decoder) is the interpolation involved during the geometric realignment process. KP detection errors are also caused by the various global image attacks that are assumed to be part of the channel noise. All these global attacks can be followed by cropping. Our dataset consists of 250 JPEG images (quality factor (QF) of 75). The key-point detection results for various attacks are presented in Table 1 . Since we embed the same data in multiple blocks, our system is successful when there is exact localization of at least one region, i.e. at least one key-point match. The attacks we performed are given below. Except the fifth attack, all other attacks are followed by a JPEG compression at an output QF of 60.
(1) Gamma-1: γ = 1.5, Gamma-2: γ = 0.6, (2) AWGN: AWGN is added at SNR of 25 dB, (3) R+S+crop: Rotation (R) at 30
• , scaling (S) along both axes at scale factor of 0.75, and then 70% of the image is retained along each dimension (the received image is properly aligned first before KP extraction), (4) blur: Gaussian blur at σ = 2, (5) JPEG: JPEG compression at a QF of 10, (6) unsharp masking: using a 3-by-3 unsharp contrast enhancement filter, (7) median filtering: using a 5x5 window.
From Table 1 , we see that even after severe noise attacks, there is still a match (one or more) between the encoder and decoder key-points. The Harris-Laplace has the best overall performance when compared with other detectors.
CONCLUSION
We have presented a key-point pruning method which combines both the corner strength magnitude and the spatial constraints (depending on block size) to obtain a reduced set of key-points distributed in different parts of an image. Using the same method, we extract almost the same key-points from the received image and decode data by centering the blocks on those points. Since we embed same data in all blocks, we will be able to decode the data when there is a match of at least one key-point with the original. Here, we assume that our data hiding system can accurately decode data even after various image attacks and geometric realignment and all it needs is the exact key-point to get the exact block. Although our pruning method outputs key-points in different parts of an image, in future, we will consider methods where we can maximize the number of key-points obtained for an image. Since cropping generally affects the image borders, key-points near the image center can be weighed more than points near the border, thus modifying the pruning method.
